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THE ROLE OF GENDER IN A
STRUCTURED SENTENCING SYSTEM:
EQUAL TREATMENT, POLICY CHOICES,
AND THE SENTENCING OF FEMALE
OFFENDERS UNDER THE UNITED STATES
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
ILENE H. NAGEL* & BARRY L. JOHNSON**
INTRODUcrION
Historically, female offenders have been at the margins of the
criminal justice system. Theories of criminal behavior, as well as stud-
ies of arrest, pre-trial, prosecution, and sentencing outcomes, have
tended to focus on patterns of criminality derived from studying male
offenders.' This does not reflect a lack of interest in female offenders,
but rather the empirical fact that the vast majority of criminal offend-
ers, especially violent criminal offenders, have been male.2 In other
words, the traditional preoccupation of theorists, researchers, and
criminal justice professionals with male offenders derives from the
gender-skewed demographics of criminal behavior.
Recently, however, the combination of the women's rights move-
ment, the rise of feminist scholarship, and the noted increase in fe-
male criminality,3 has begun to reverse this long-standing neglect of
* Member of the United States Sentencing Commission and Professor of Law at Indi-
ana University (Bloomington) School of Law. The views expressed here are those of the
individual authors and are not meant to represent the views of the United States Sentenc-
ing Commission.
** Assistant Professor of Law at Oklahoma City University School of Law and former law
clerk to Commissioner Nagel.
1 See; e.g., RrrAJ. SIMON &JEAN LANDIS, THE CRIMES WOMEN COMMIT, THE PUNISHMENTS
THEY RECEIvE xv-xx (1991).
2 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PuNIsHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 213 (1993)
(noting that the relative paucity of female offenders has been a "constant, throughout
American history" and that "the more serious the crime, the less likely.., women commit
it").
3 The percentage of females among convicted offenders in U.S. District Courts rose
from 7.0% in 1963 to 10.8% in 1979. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CouRTs, FEDERAL
OFFENDERS IN THE UNIrD STATES Disrmucr COURTS 1963 10 (1964); ADMIN. OFFCE OF THE
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female criminality and inattention to the outcome of decisions involv-
ing females in the criminal justice system. And, "a rich and complex
literature . . . devoted to the issues of gender and crime" has
emerged.4 A good deal of this literature examines the treatment of
women by key criminal justice decisionmakers, such as police, prose-
cutors, and judges. One commonly tested hypothesis is that when
these decision-makers are free to exercise discretion, they systemati-
cally favor female offenders over similarly situated male offenders.5
This pattern of gender-based leniency is particularly evident at the sen-
tencing phase. Female offenders tend to benefit at sentencing from
what many presume to be a benign form of reverse discrimination.6
Despite the recency of the "women and crime" literature, it may
describe sentencing patterns that no longer exist. Much of the re-
search contained in these works is based on data collected in the
1960s and 1970s. In the 1980s, however, significant efforts were made
to reform sentencing systems at both the state and federal levels.
These reforms were designed to substantially reduce judicial sentenc-
ing discretion, to reduce unwarranted sentencing disparities, and to
reduce race, gender, and class discrimination. Moreover, these re-
forms, at least at the federal level, shifted the focus of sentencing from
"offender" characteristics, such as family and community ties, educa-
tion, and employment, to "offense" characteristics and the offender's
criminal history.7 If successful, these reforms will reduce the favorable
treatment previously afforded female offenders, by increasing both
their incarceration rate and the length of their sentences.
One desired effect of these sweeping efforts at sentencing reform
was to increase the visibility of policy choices underlying sentencing
decisions. 8 As a result, many issues with potentially significant impact
on female offenders, previously obscured by a system of unfettered
and unreviewed discretionary sentencing, are now ripe for revisitation
and debate. These issues include whether a convicted offender's
pregnancy or child care responsibilities should affect the type and
U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL OFFENDERS IN UNITED STATES Disriuc COURT 1979 75 (1980). Fe-
males represented 16.4% of offenders sentenced under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
in fiscal year 1992. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT Table 13 (1992).
4 SIMON & LANDIS, supra note 1, at xv.
5 See infra notes 9-50.
6 See infra notes 34-50.
7 See infra notes 53-73.
8 Cf United States v. Quintero, 937 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussing the use of
uncharged conduct in determining the guidelines sentencing range). As the Second Cir-
cuit noted: "for all the criticism the guidelines have attracted, one of their virtues is the
illumination of practices and policies that were applicable in the pre-guidelines era, but
that received less attention when sentences were only a generalized aggregation of various
factors, many of which were frequently unarticulated." Id. at 97.
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length of her sentence; whether courts should consider evidence of
psychological coercion that does not rise to the level of a complete
defense; and whether courts should consider the offender's emotional
condition or the offender's role in the offense. While these issues are
relevant to all offenders, some authorities believe that they have more,
or at least potentially different, relevance for female offenders. These
highly complex policy issues raise difficult questions for feminists, who
must balance theories of criminal justice against theories of gender
equality. Furthermore, people disagree about how to define gender
justice and about how to achieve it.
This article explores some of these issues through an analysis of
the impact of federal sentencing reform on the sentencing of female
offenders. It begins with an examination of the literature analyzing
the sentencing of female offenders under the indeterminate, rehabili-
tative approach which prevailed before the adoption of the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act of 1984.9
Section I discusses the efforts of Congress and the United States
Sentencing Commission, as directed by Congress, to implement
facially neutral sentencing guidelines, in order to reduce unwarranted
sentencing disparity and eliminate the sentencing impact of extralegal
factors such as the offender's race, gender, and socioeconomic status.
The implications of the Sentencing Reform Act's goal of gender neu-
trality are examined in light of the broader debate about "equal treat-
ment" versus "special treatment" that has engaged feminist scholars in
other areas of the law.
Section II focuses on several issues in the federal guidelines sen-
tencing scheme that are of special concern to women, because of the
potential for a disparate gender-based impact. These issues include
pregnancy, single parenthood, coercion, dominance, and the of-
fender's role in the offense.
Finally, Section III contains an empirical review of the sentencing
of female offenders under the federal sentencing guidelines. In an
effort to assess the impact of guidelines on traditional patterns of leni-
ent treatment of female offenders, this section examines United States
Sentencing Commission data on the sentencing patterns for females
convicted in any of three offense categories: drug trafficking, embez-
zlement, and larceny.
I. DIFERErrTIAL SENTENCING OF WOMEN IN THE PRE-GUIDELINES ERA
Throughout much of the twentieth century, society viewed reha-
9 Pub. L No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2,98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-
3673; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998.
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bilitation as the primary purpose of incarceration.' 0 The dominance
of the rehabilitative ideal is reflected in Justice Black's majority opin-
ion in Williams v. New York,' in which he explained that "[r] etribution
is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation
and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of crimi-
naljurisprudence."'12 This focus on rehabilitation required a concom-
itant emphasis on the personal characteristics of the offender: "a
prevalent modem philosophy of penology [is] that the punishment
should fit the offender and not merely the crime. The belief no
longer prevails that every offense in a like legal category calls for an
identical punishment without regard to the past life and habits of a par-
ticular offender.
" 13
Williams reflected the prevailing philosophy not only of the
courts, but of criminology experts, and the public as well.14 The influ-
ence of the rehabilitative ideal is evinced by the adoption, throughout
this century, of a number of criminal justice reforms designed to re-
place fixed punishments with more flexible, offender-oriented
sentencing.'
5
The focus of rehabilitative sentencing is the offender's need for
treatment. Those adhering to this approach view the sentence as the
instrument of that treatment. Accordingly, they believe that the sen-
tence should promote the offender's rehabilitation, and not merely
reflect the nature of the crime committed. 16 This assessment, often
analogized to a doctor's diagnosis and treatment of a patient's disease,
requires tremendous flexibility for the sentencer to "individualize" the
10 Rehabilitationism in American penal thought can be traced to the National Congress
of Prisons' 1870 Declaration of Principles, which stated that the "supreme aim of prison
discipline is the reformation of criminals and not the infliction of vindictive suffering."
AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF PRIS-
ONS AND REFORMATORY DISCIPLINE (1870). See also United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46
(1978).
11 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
12 Id. at 248.
13 Id. at 247 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
14 See FRANCIs A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABLrrATAVE IDEAL 5-7 (1981). See also
HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 12-13 (1968) (explaining that
the "behavioral" view of crime associated with the rehabilitative ideal was so widely ac-
cepted by psychiatrists, criminologists, and corrections professionals that it was absorbed by
the popular culture).
15 ALLEN, supra note 14, at 6 ("Almost all of the characteristic innovations in criminal
justice in this century are reflections of the rehabilitative ideal: the juvenile court, the inde-
terminate sentence, systems of probation and parole, the youth authority, and the promise
(if not the reality) of therapeutic programs in prisons, juvenile institutions, and mental
hospitals."). For example, by the 1960s, every state in the nation had some form of indeter-
minate sentencing. Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring SentencingDiscretion: The New Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 894 (1990).
16 ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOINGJUSTICE 12 (1976).
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sentence to best promote the offender's rehabilitation. As Justice
Black explained: "[h]ighlyrelevant-if not essential-to [thejudge's]
selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest in-
formation possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics."
17
The discretionary nature of this sentencing system led to the
emergence of unwarranted disparities in the sentencing of offenders
convicted of similar offenses, and possessing similar criminal histories.
This disparity arose largely because of differences in judicial values,
attitudes, and sentencing philosophy. As Willard Gaylin concluded:
each [judge] has a point of view, a set of standards and values, a bias, if
you will, which will color, influence, and direct the nature of his verdicts
independently of the specific condition of the criminal being
charged ....
These sets of values constitute bias in a non-pejorative sense-but
bias nonetheless, and a bias that will influence equity and fairness in
exactly the same way as naked bigotry does.
18
Further, the lack of standards governing judges' sentencing deci-
sions created a risk that they would be inappropriately influenced by
offender attributes such as race, gender, age, and socioeconomic sta-
tus.19 The impact of these extralegal factors on sentencing generated
considerable interest in the 1970s and 1980s. 20 While race bias gener-
ated the most research, some empirical analyses focused on questions
of gender. Research examined whether courts treated female offend-
ers differently than male offenders at the sentencing stage and
whether those differences reflected different criminal conduct by
males and females, or a preference for leniency toward women which
was unrelated to the offense.21 The results consistently revealed that
adult female offenders receive more favorable sentences than similarly
situated male offenders.
22
17 Williams, 337 U.S. at 247 (emphasis added).
18 WIu.ARD GAYLiN, P~a~RAsJus-ncE 162-65 (1974). See also S. REP. No. 225,98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 41 & n.18 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3224 (citing evidence that
federal judges disagree about the purposes of sentencing and noting that this disagree-
ment is a cause of sentencing disparity).
19 SeeJohn Hagan, Extra-Legal Attributes and Criminal Sentencing An Assessment of a Socio-
logical Vrewpoin, 8 LAw & Soc'y REv. 357, 358 (1974). See also Ilene H. Nagel, The Legal!
Extra-Legal Controversy: Judicial Decisions in Pretrial Release 17 LAw & Soc'y REv. 481 (1983).
20 See Hagan, supra note 19, at 358; Nagel, supra note 19, at 481.
21 See infra notes 23-50.
22 Thus, Rita Simon and Jean Landis concluded in a 1991 review of studies on gender
and sentencing:
Most observers feel that women receive preferential treatment, which in operational
terms means that they are less likely than men to be convicted for the same type of
offense; if they are convicted, they are less likely to be sentenced [to prison]; and if
they are sentenced, they are likely to receive milder sentences.
SIMON & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 57.
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This preferential treatment is most pronounced with respect to
the decision of whether or not to incarcerate the offender. Women
are more likely than similarly situated men to receive suspended
sentences or probation. However, there is less disparity in the term of
incarceration, particularly for serious offenses involving lengthy
sentences.2
3
This pattern is subject to some caveats. Commentators have criti-
cized studies reporting a gender impact in sentencing. Some have
pointed to the methodological limitations, such as the failure to con-
trol adequately for offense seriousness and prior record;24 others have
noted that the small number of cases and offenses analyzed in those
studies limit available analytic techniques, as well as the general-
izability of the findings. 25 Moreover, studies of gender and sentencing
have not been unanimous in finding statistically significant differ-
ences between sentences for male and female offenders.2 6
Despite these criticisms, an impressive number of methodologi-
cally sound, multivariate studies report that women offenders receive
preferential treatment.27 For example, in a study of sentences meted
out to 6562 offenders convicted in ten federal district courts, Hagan,
Nagel, and Albonetti found that gender affects sentence severity in
white collar cases, even after controlling for variables such as the of-
fender's prior record, the number and severity of the charged of-
fenses, the type of offense, and the defendant's age, ethnicity,
education, and physical health.28 In a subsequent study, Hagan,
Nagel, and Albonetti analyzed the sentences of 1239 defendants con-
victed in the state of New York. They controlled for prior record, of-
23 See, e.g., Ilene H. Nagel &John Hagan, Gender and Crime: Offense Patterns and Criminal
Court Sanctions, in 4 CRIME ANDJUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REvIEw OF RESEARCH 91, 129 (Michael
Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1983).
24 See, e.g., Darrell J. Steffensmeier, Assessing the Impact of the Women's Movement on Sex-
Based Differences in the Handling of Adult Criminal Defendants, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 344, 346
(1980) (suggesting that apparent link between sentencing outcomes and gender may be an
artifact of inadequate control for offense seriousness and prior record).
25 Id. at 344-49.
26 See, e.g., Candace Kruttschnitt & Donald E. Green, The Sex Sanctioning Issue: Is it
History, 49 Am. Soc. REv. 541, 550 (1984). See also William Wilbanks, Are Female Felons
Treated More Leniently by the Criminal Justice System?, 3 JusT. Q. 516, 521-28 (1986); Hagan,
supra note 19, at 375 (finding effect of gender on sentencing to be negligible).
27 See, e.g., William M. Rhodes, A Study of Sentencing in Hennepin County and Ramsey
County District Courts, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 350 (1977);John Hagan et al., CeremonialJustice:
Crime and Punishment in a Loosely Coupled System, 58 Soc. FORCES 506 (1979); Ilene H. Nagel
et al., Sex Dfferences in the Processing of Criminal Defendants, in 1 WOMEN AND THE LAW: A
SoCIAL HisroiucA PERSPECrrVE 259, 266-69 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1982);John Hagan et
al., The Differential Sentencing of White Collar Offenders in Ten Federal District Courts, 45 AM.
Soc. REv. 802, 811-15 (1980) [hereinafter Hagan et al., White Collar Offenders].
28 See Hagan et al., White Collar Offenders, supra note 27, at 811-15.
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fense characteristics, and offender characteristics such as race, age,
and employment, and found that females were treated preferentially
at sentencing.
29
These quantitative analyses are consistent with the findings de-
rived from qualitative data collected through interviews with judges, in
which many acknowledged treating female offenders preferentially.
Simon and Landis cite a 1973 study of twenty-three judges in large
midwestern cities, in which more than half said that "'they do treat
women more leniently and more gently than they do men; that they
are more inclined to recommend probation rather than imprison-
ment; and if they sentence a woman, it is usually for a shorter time
than if the crime had been committed by a man.'"30 Simon and Lan-
dis also cite a 1988 study, in which twelve judges in the Washington
D.C. area discussed the sentencing of women. Eleven of them re-
ported that "they 'tended to treat women more gently than they do
men.'"3
In 1983, Professors Ilene Nagel andJohn Hagan reviewed the ex-
isting empirical literature and found that the bulk of research on gen-
der and crime-drawn from a variety of both state and federal courts,
and using a variety of methodological techniques-supported the
preferential treatment hypothesis. 32 More recent analyses of the liter-
ature reach the same conclusion.33
Thus, a reading of the extant empirical literature on gender and
sentencing compels the conclusion that gender has had a significant
impact on sentencing outcomes. While the effect of the gender varia-
ble is sometimes small relative to other factors, such as offense severity
and the offender's prior criminal record, it is, as Nagel and Hagan
29 See Nagel et al., supra note 27, at 272-73.
30 SIMON & LANDIs, supra note 1, at 59 (quoting Debra AnthonyJudges' Perceptions of
Women Offenders and Their Own Actions Toward Women Offenders (1973) (unpub-
lished Master's Thesis, University of Illinois)).
31 Id. at 62 (citing Angela Musolino, Judge's Attitudes Toward Female Offenders, at 15
(1988) (unpublished manuscript).
32 As Nagel and Hagan concluded: "[c]learly, the research on sentencing produces the
strongest evidence for the thesis that gender does affect court outcome decisions and that
women receive preferential treatment." Nagel & Hagan, supra note 23, at 134.
33 See Darrell Steffensmeier et al., Gender and Imprisonment Decisions, 31 CRIMINOLOGY
411 (1993). Their literature review reveals that
a fairly persistent finding has been that adult female defendants are treated more
leniently than adult male defendants.... [T]he studies substantiate the widely held
belief that female defendants receive more lenient treatment (apparently) because of
judicial paternalism, the social costs to children and families of sending women to
prison, or the view that female defendants are less dangerous and more amenable to
rehabilitation than male defendants.
Id, at 411-12. Steffensmeier et al., note, however, that some of these studies have signifi-
cant methodological weaknesses. Id. at 413-16.
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noted, "demonstrably present."3 4
The question of why women receive preferential treatment in
criminal sentencing is an intriguing one. When the pattern was first
recognized, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, much of the sociological
literature focused on the chivalry/paternalism thesis.3 5 Although
chivalry and paternalism are not consistently and precisely defined,
3 6
these concepts refer generally to a protective attitude toward women,
linked to gender stereotypes of women as (1) weaker and more pas-
sive than men, and therefore not proper subjects for imprisonment;
and (2) more submissive and dependent than men, and therefore less
responsible for their crimes.3 7 Judges also apparently regarded wo-
men as more easily manipulable than men, and hence more amenable
to rehabilitative efforts.38 The chivalry/patemalism thesis is consis-
tent with the Anthony and Musolinojudge interview studies, in which
many judges voiced chivalrous attitudes toward women. For example,
one judge in the Musolino study observed: "I don't think there's any
rational or objective thought about it, but there's a feeling that incar-
ceration for a woman is far more degrading than for a man, and you'll
never see them (women) back because they'll do everything they can
to keep from going back."
39
Research shows, however, that judges are selectively chivalrous.
Empirical evidence indicates that minority women are (or at least
have been, in the recent past) treated more harshly by the criminal
justice system than white offenders. 40 Further, studies suggest that
law enforcement officials reserve chivalrous treatment for middle and
upper class women who conform to gender stereotypes. 41 The selec-
34 Nagel & Hagan, supra note 23, at 134.
35 See, e.g., SIMON & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 11 (a "theme running through much of the
women and crime literature in the past fifteen years has been the issue of chivalry").
36 See Kathleen Daly, Structure and Practice of a Familial-Based Justice in a Criminal Court, 21
LAw & Soc'Y REv. 267, 268 n.2 (1987).
37 See Steffensmeier, supra note 24, at 350-51.
38 Id. at 351-52.
39 SIMoN & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 62 (citing Angela Musolino, Judge's Attitudes To-
ward Female Offenders, at 16 (1988) (unpublished manuscript).
40 See Cassia Spohn et al., Women Defendants in Court: The Interaction Between Sex and Race
in Convicting and Sentencing, 66 Soc. Sc. Q. 178, 182 (1985).
41 See Christy A. Visher, Gender, Police Arrest Decisions, and Notions of Chivalry, 21 CRIMi-
NOLOGY 5, 22-23 (1983), who found that
[i] n encounters with police officers, those female suspects who violate [d] typical mid-
dle-class standards of traditional female characteristics and behaviors (i.e., white, older
and submissive) are not afforded any chivalrous treatment during arrest decisions. In
these data, young, black, or hostile women receive no preferential treatment, whereas
older, white women who are calm and deferential toward the police are granted
leniency.
See also CLARICE FEINMAN, WOMEN IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 28 (2d ed. 1986) ("Chiv-
alry is reserved for white middle- and upper-class women, except those who flout culturally
[Vol. 85
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tive application of chivalrous treatment may exacerbate racial and so-
cioeconomic sentencing disparities.
Although some early researchers did not view the preferential
treatment of women as especially troubling,42 Elizabeth F. Moulds ar-
gued convincingly that this benign view of preferential sentencing was
misguided.43 Moulds analyzed the conceptual distinctions between
chivalry and paternalism, pointing out that notions of paternalism im-
ply a power relationship analogous to that between parent and child.
Paternalism equates women with children, viewing them as incapable
of assessing information and making responsible decisions, and thus
less culpable for their criminal behavior. The negative social implica-
tions of this paternalistic attitude are obvious. Moulds notes that:
It is important to be wary of a society which permits paternalism to color
the perceptions of those who make and enforce the law. Those percep-
tions profoundly affect behavior of those in power and the behavior of
those paternalized in a manner that is inconsistent with the operation of
a democratic state. A basic denial of self-determination is what is taking
place.4
4
Thus, stereotyping associated with paternalism negatively impacts wo-
men and should not be assumed to be benign simply because it results
in leniency in a specific context. In fact, such stereotypes can harm
female offenders in more direct ways. Nagel and Hagan found empir-
ical support for a corollary to the chivalry/paternalism thesis-the
"evil woman" thesis-which hypothesizes that women whose criminal
behavior violates sex-stereotypical assumptions about the proper role
of women are treated more harshly than their male counterparts. 45 For
example, studies have shown that women are sentenced to longer
terms than men for such gender role-defying offenses as child aban-
donment and assault.46 In other words, not only do certain types of
female offenders fail to benefit from paternalistic treatment, they are
actually subject to heightened punishment for their choice of an "un-
ladylike" offense.
The chivalry thesis is not universally accepted as the explanation
for gender differences in sentencing. Some authors attribute these
differences to a concern for the parental role of female offenders and
expected behavior for ladies.").
42 Nagel & Hagan, supra note 23, at 114.
43 Elizabeth F. Moulds, Chivalry and Paternalism: Disparities of Treatment in the Criminal
Justice System, in WomEN, CmiME, AND Jusnca 277, 283 (Susan K. Datesman & Frank R.
Scarpitti eds., 1980).
44 Id. at 282.
45 See Nagel & Hagan, supra note 23, at 135-36.
46 See Matthew Zingraff & Randall Thomson, Differential Sentencing of Women and Men in
the U.S.A., 12 INr'LJ. Soc. LAw 401, 410 (1984).
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the family disruption that judges assume would result from their incar-
ceration. 47 For example, Kathleen Daly's interviews of judges, attor-
neys, and probation officers revealed that familied defendants of both
sexes are treated more leniently than their non-familied counterparts;
however, she also reported that familied women are treated more leni-
ently than familied men.48 Daly attributed this disparity to the fact
that judges attach more importance to the predominantly female role
of care-giving than to the predominantly male role of bread-win-
ning.49 She concluded that much of the lenient treatment afforded
women is probably related to their role as primary caretakers of
children.
Despite the difference in focus, most observers conclude that
chivalry or paternalism plays some role in explaining the more lenient
treatment of female offenders reported in the empirical literature. 50
The next section attempts to reconcile this pattern of preferential
treatment in sentencing with the value feminists attach to equality of
treatment in a wide variety of social and legal contexts. As noted, the
normative implications of paternalistic, lenient treatment are poten-
tially troubling from a feminist perspective. 5 1 While paternalism re-
sults in some female offenders spending less time in prison, it also
reflects damaging stereotypes of female weakness, as well as a funda-
mental denial of the status of female offenders as responsible moral
agents. Moreover, even to the extent that differential treatment re-
flects perceived differences in parental roles, rather than broader no-
tions of paternalism, such treatment is potentially damaging in that it
ratifies traditional gender roles and stereotypes about the child care
responsibilities of women.
II. GENDER "NEUTRALITY" AND FEMINIST DILEMMAs IN A GUIDELINES
WORLD
Most of the data discussed in the previous section was collected at
a time when rehabilitation was the principal purpose of sentencing,
47 See Kathleen Daly, Rethinking Judicial Paternalism: Gender, Wor*-Family Relations, and
Sentencing, 3 GENDER & Soc'v 9 (1989); Daly, supra note 36, at 282-84; Candace
Kruttschnitt, Sex and Criminal Court Dispositions: The Unresolved Controversy 21 Rxs. CReME &
DEULNQ. 213, 224-27(1984).
48 Daly, supra note 36, at 282-83.
49 Id
50 Indeed, even Daly, who concluded that family concerns motivate much of the lenient
treatment of women, acknowledged that the judicial decisionmaking in her study was "not
completely devoid of female paternalism." I& at 283. Moreover, the majority of probation
officers and attorneys in her study believed that judicial leniency was based on paternalism.
Id.




and judges enjoyed substantial latitude in administering their
sentences.52 It is not clear, however, that the patterns reported are
replicated in today's criminal justice system. As stated, substantial re-
forms designed specifically to reduce sentencing discretion, such as
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the ensuing federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, have restricted judicial discretion and shifted the fo-
cus of sentencing away from the personal characteristics of the
offender to the circumstances of the offense.53 This section discusses
the Sentencing Reform Act's emphasis on gender neutral sentencing
and the implications of this neutrality for the just sentencing of fe-
male offenders.
A. NEUTRALrIY AND THE GUIDELINES SCHEME
The Sentencing Reform Act embodies Congress' rejection of
traditional penal rehabilitationism. The Act: (1) abolishes parole and
adopts a determinate, "real time" sentencing scheme;54 and (2) struc-
tures and narrows judicial sentencing discretion through the creation
of a single administrative agency"-the United States Sentencing Com-
mission-empowered to promulgate presumptively binding sentenc-
ing guidelines.55 The Act's legislative history clearly establishes that
Congress' "primary goal" in undertaking sentencing reform was the
elimination of unwarranted sentencing disparity.56 Advocates of sen-
tencing reform repeatedly emphasized the unfairness of the fact that
offenders convicted of the same crime and possessing similar criminal
histories, received vastly different sentences. 57 Moreover, Congress
was especially sensitive to the need to reduce disparities associated
with such factors as the defendant's race, gender, and socioeconomic
status. Thus, Congress instructed the Commission to "assure that the
guidelines and policy statements are entirely neutral as to the race, sex,
national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders."58 Fur-
thermore, Congress instructed the Commission to de-emphasize the
traditional "individualizing" factors which predominated in rehabilita-
tive sentencing-e.g., family and community ties, occupation, and ed-
ucation-as part of the overall mandate to shift from a rehabilitative
sentencing system focused on the.offender to a system emphasizing the
52 See, e.g., Steffensmeier et al., supra note 33, at 413.
53 See, eg., infra notes 53-73 and accompanying text.
54 See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon
Which They Rest, 17 HorsFm L. Rnv. 1, 4 (1988).
55 Id. at 4-5.
56 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 18, at 52, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CAN. at 3225.
57 See, e.g., Edward M. Kennedy, Toward a New System of Criminal Sentencing Law With
Order, 16 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 353, 353-54 (1979).
58 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1988) (emphasis added).
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seriousness of the offense.59
Rather than articulating a single purpose of sentencing, Congress
chose an amalgam of goals it wanted the Sentencing Reform Act to
meet.60 It is clear, however, that the dual purposes of 'Just punish-
ment" for the offense and "crime control," are of primary impor-
tance. 61 The principal evil Congress sought to remedy-unwarranted
sentencing disparity62-implicitly rests on notions of deserved or
'just" punishment.
63
Crime control concerns-deterrence and incapacitation of of-
fenders-were also important to Congress. 64 Indeed, the Sentencing
Reform Act is merely one aspect of Congress' rejection of indetermi-
nate, rehabilitation-based sentencing in favor of a sentencing philoso-
phy emphasizing punishment and crime control. Throughout the
1980s Congress increasingly adopted mandatory minimum sentencing
schemes, which completely eliminate the consideration of the individual
offender characteristics that were the staple of traditional rehabilita-
tive sentencing. Instead, single offense characteristics are the bases
for imposing punishment and controlling crime.
65
59 See, e.g., Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FORES L. REv. 223, 250-51, 284 (1993)
(language and legislative history of the Act demonstrate Congress' skepticism about the
appropriateness of considering the offender's personal characteristics in sentencing); Ells-
worth A. Van Graafeiland, Some Thoughts on the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,31 VILL. L. REv.
1291, 1293 (1986) (Congress' instructions "have led the Commission to concentrate more
on the nature and extent of the injury or harm resulting from the defendant's acts than on
... the defendant's character and mental processes.").
See also United States v. Vela, 927 F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 214
(1991) ("One of the primary goals of the Sentencing Guidelines is to impose a sentence
based on the crime, not the offender."); United States v. McHan, 920 F.2d 244, 247 (4th
Cir. 1990) ("One of Congress' primary purposes in establishing the Guidelines was to re-
duce sentencing disparities and to rest sentences upon the offense committed, not upon
the offender.").
60 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2) (1988) (instructing courts to consider all four traditional
purposes of sentencing-just punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation).
See also S. REP. No. 225, supra note 18, at 67-68, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3250-51
(explaining that the Act generally does not explicitly "favor[ ] one purpose of sentencing
over another").
61 See, e.g., Steven P. Lab, Potential Deterrent Effects of the Guidelines, in THE U.S. SENTENC-
ING GUIDELINES: IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 32, 32-33 (Dean J. Champion ed.,
1989).
62 See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 18, at 52, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3235 ("A
primary goal of sentencing reform is the elimination of unwarranted sentencing
disparity.").
63 See, e.g., VON HRSCH, supra note 16.
64 See Nagel, supra note 15, at 916.
65 According to Senator Phil Gramm who is a longtime supporter of mandatory mini-
mum sentences, Congress passed mandatory minimums to accomplish the dual grounds of
incapacitating hardened criminals and giving them their just punishment. Phil Gramm,
Mandatory Minimums for Sentencing?, WASHINGTON TIMES, October 18, 1993, at B4.
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Consistent with the statutory mandate, the Commission promul-
gated guidelines embodying the dual purposes of "just punishment"
and "crime control." The guidelines establish sentencing ranges
based on the offense, the presence of certain enumerated aggravating
and mitigating factors related to the offense, and the offender's crimi-
nal history. Other potentially aggravating or mitigating circumstances
may allow judges to depart from the guidelines' range, but only if they
involve factors "not adequately taken into consideration by the Sen-
tencing Commission in formulating the guidelines" and demand a
sentence outside the guidelines' range.66 Further, these departures
are subject to appellate review.
67
In addition to the sentencing guidelines submitted to Congress,
the Commission promulgated a series of policy statements which pro-
vide that an offender's age, physical condition, mental or emotional
condition, and family and community ties are not ordinarily relevant in
decisions to depart from the guidelines. 68 The Commission chose the
words "not ordinarily relevant" to make it clear that these factors may
be relevant only in extraordinary cases.69 In marked contrast, gender,
like race, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status, is never
relevant. 70
Finally, the guidelines emphasize offense characteristics and cul-
pability factors such as the offender's role in the offense, the level of
planning involved in the offense, and whether a weapon was used.
This focus is consistent with the goal of "just punishment" for the
offense.
The Commission sought to incorporate crime control considera-
tions through provisions requiring sentences at or near the statutory
maximum for repeat, violent offenders. 71 The importance of deter-
rence is evident in the Commission's decision (at Congress' urging) to
impose incarcerative sentences for white collar crimes,72 which many
have argued are more easily deterred than typical street crimes.
66 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
67 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1988).
68 See UNrrED STATES SENTENciNG COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MAUAL §§ 5H1.1 (age),
5H1.2 (education and vocational skills), 5H1.3 (mental and emotional conditions), 5H1.4
(physical condition), 5H1.5 (employment), and 5111.6 (family and community ties) (Nov.
1993) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
69 See U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt.A, intro, comment., at 5-6.
70 See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10.
71 See U.S.S.G. §§ 4111.1 (Career Offender), 4B1.4 (Armed Career Criminal).
72 This also reflected, in part, desert-based concerns that white collar criminals were
receiving more lenient sentences than property offenders of lower socioeconomic status.
See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 18, at 77, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3260 ("[Some
major offenders, particularly white collar offenders and serious violent crime offenders,
frequently do not receive sentences that reflect the seriousness of their offenses.").
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In short, the 1980s marked a period of increased concern for
more equal treatment of similarly situated offenders. Reflecting this
concern, the Sentencing Reform Act and the resulting sentencing
guidelines embody aspirations of gender-neutral sentencing. One po-
tential consequence of this neutrality, however, is the elimination, or
at least reduction, of the traditional leniency afforded female offend-
ers described in section I, above. It is unclear whether Congress spe-
cifically intended this result. While Congress was clear in its
prescription of gender neutrality, the legislative history contains no
discussion of the potential consequences of this neutrality for the
overall severity of the sentences of female offenders. As more women
are subject to this facially gender-neutral system, the question increas-
ingly asked is whether strict gender neutrality is desirable in the sen-
tencing context.78 It is here that those favoring leniency come into
conflict with those who, for the sake of feminist equality, are willing to
forego leniency if it derives from inappropriate values or from gender
stereotypes. The next section examines this tension between formal
equality and leniency.
B. THE FEMINIST DILEMMA: EQUAL TREATMENT V. SPECIAL TREATMENT
OF FEMALE OFFENDERS
Feminist legal theorists have vigorously debated whether to advo-
cate formal, legal equality with men, or to support special treatment,
recognizing pertinent gender differences. Advocates of an "equal
treatment" approach recognize that although men and women differ
in many important respects (especially with respect to reproduction),
special treatment of women entails significant risks, because the laws
meant to protect women have oppressed them.74 As one commenta-
tor noted: "[e]xperience with protective-labor legislation, preferential-
welfare statutes, child-custody presumptions, and maternity policies
makes clear that 'benign discrimination' is a mixed blessing."75 The
early wave of feminist litigators, such as Supreme Court Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, successfully emphasized formal, legal, equal treat-
ment in their efforts to break down the gender-based classifications
73 See, e.g., Myrna S. Raeder, Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered Women, and
Other Sex-Based Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 20 PEPP.
L. Rxv. 905 (1993).
74 See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts and
Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 175, 196-200 (1982).
75 DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 319 (1989). See also Wendy W. Williams,
Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and theEqual Treatment/Special Treatment Debate 13 N.Y.U. REv. L.
& Soc. CHANGE 325, 363 n.144 (1984-85) ("The history of governmental regulation and
private practice with respect to femaleness, female sexuality and female reproductive ca-
pacity justifies treating such classifications as suspect.").
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which acted as barriers to women's participation in social and eco-
nomic institutions.
76
In contrast to the equal treatment model, special treatment mod-
els of gender equality emphasize the cultural and biological differ-
ences between men and women and advocate the need for special
protection of women's interests based on those differences.77 Eliza-
beth Wolgast, one proponent of special rights, contends that women
cannot be men's "equals" because equality requires sameness. In-
stead, she suggests seeking "justice," which in her view requires special
treatment of women in light of their special circumstances. 78
Ultimately, both "equal treatment" and "special treatment" mod-
els provide valuable insights into the public policy debate about the
role of gender in sentencing. However, a monolithic approach to ac-
counting for gender is insufficiently sensitive to the contexts in which
gender equity is evaluated. That is, whether equal treatment or spe-
cial treatment is appropriate depends largely on the specific legal is-
sues and underlying factual circumstances involved.7 9 In addressing
the issue of pregnancy in the employment context, Wendy Williams
makes a similar point:
The question is not whether pregnancy is different (it is, of course-it has
76 See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
77 See, e.g., Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1279
(1987); Euz~sum H. WOLGAST, EQUALrTy AND THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN 14-15 (1980).
78 WOLcAST, supra note 77, at 14-15. "Equal treatment" and "special treatment" are, as
Littleton explains, rather inapt terms, in that both strive for more equitable treatment of
women. In that sense, the "special" treatment is designed to be equalizing at some level.
Littleton, supra note 77, at 1286-87. Moreover, the equal/special treatment dichotomy fails
to capture the nuances and complexity of the approaches to gender equity appearing in
the literature. There have emerged a number of variations of these approaches, which are
catalogued by Littleton. These variations include "accommodationst" approaches, which
call for equal treatment except in certain defined circumstances. Littleton, supra note 77,
at 1297. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955,
1007-13 (1984) (calling for equal treatment except with respect to reproduction, where
biology demands differential treatment); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of
Pregnancy, 1 Bmu as WoMEN's LJ. 1, 27-37 (1985) (calling for equal treatment except for
the duration of a woman's pregnancy). Littleton herself advocates an "acceptance" ap-
proach, which she categorizes as a type of special treatment approach, Under this ap-
proach, the "function of equality is to make gender differences, perceived or actual,
costless relative to each other." Littleton, supra note 77, at 1297.
In practice, the differences among these approaches are relatively subtle. All, includ-
ing the equal treatment approach, acknowledge the need to account for gender differ-
ences, but place varying emphasis on the presumption of formal, legal neutrality, and
differ on the circumstances under which the law should recognize gender differences to
foster more equitable treatment of women.
79 Also, the value one attaches to leniency influences whether equal treatment or spe-
cial treatment is appropriate. See supra notes 74-77.
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its own specific physical manifestations, course of development, risks,
and a different, usually desirable and certainly life altering outcome),
but how it is different. ... The focus of the pregnancy debate, as with
men and women or blacks and whites, should be on whether the differences
should be deemed relevant in the context of particular employment rules.8o
Similarly, broader questions of gender equity turn on whether differ-
ences between men and women are pertinent in the context of the
particular legal and policy issues addressed. The values underlying
criminal sentencing suggest that it is an area in which the need for
formal gender neutrality has special resonance.
Divergence from principles of equal treatment is potentially in-
consistent with deeply held notions of fairness in a broad range of
contexts. As Justice Scalia has remarked:
As a motivating force of the human spirit, that value [the appearance of
equal treatment] cannot be overestimated. Parents know that children
will accept quite readily all sorts of arbitrary substantive dispositions-no
television in the afternoon, or no television in the evening, or even no
television at all. But try to let one brother or sister watch television when
the others do not, and you will feel the fury of the fundamental sense of
justice unleashed.
8 1
This fundamental appeal of equal treatment is heightened by the spe-
cial characteristics of criminal punishment.
Criminal punishment is distinctive in the law because of its con-
demnatory character. Unlike other legal sanctions (e.g., for breach of
contract), criminal sentencing imparts blame on the offender.8 2 The
extent of reprobation is represented, in part, by the severity of the
punishment imposed. Punishing offenders to a degree inconsistent
with the nature of their crimes and the level of their culpability is
unjust, because it imparts more or less blame than the offender de-
serves.8 3 And sentencing offenders found guilty of identical crimes to
vastly different terms of imprisonment seems inconsistent with com-
mon-sense notions of justice.
Moreover, the injustice of unequal treatment in sentencing is
highlighted by the stakes involved. Criminal sentencing, which in-
volves drastic deprivations of freedom and associated moral stigma,
affects fundamental liberty interests. Congress recognized that the
very legitimacy of the criminal justice system is at risk if the appear-
ance of equal treatment is breached.
8 4
80 Williams, supra note 75, at 357 (second emphasis added).
81 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1175, 1178
(1989).
82 See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishmen in SENmNCNG 23, 24-26
(Hyman Gross & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 1981).
83 See VON Hmscu, supra note 16, at 71-73.
84 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 225, supra note 18, at 46, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3229
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Special treatment of women in sentencing potentially under-
mines the strong principles ofjustice and equity that animate contem-
porary notions of blameworthiness and proportionality. Moreover, a
special treatment approach to criminal sentencing should trouble
feminists, because it perpetuates damaging stereotypes of female
weakness, implying a moral inferiority that undermines claims to full
citizenship and even personhood.85 The blameworthiness that sup-
ports notions of proportional punishment implies a recognition of the
full moral agency of the offender.86 Society believes that it is inappro-
priate to punish the very young or the insane, because, unlike respon-
sible adults, they cannot be expected to conform their behavior to the
norms of the law. Only those fully capable of understanding criminal
norms and conforming their behavior to those norms are fit subjects
for punishment. Thus, when women are granted special treatment,
they are reduced to the moral status of infants.
In short, formal equal treatment under the criminal justice sys-
tem, and questions of the allocation of criminal sentences, touch on
fundamental notions of moral autonomy in a way that questions of
formal equal treatment in employment rules or insurance benefits do
not. In the context of criminal sentencing, those who advocate spe-
cial treatment of any particular group, or ostensibly neutral rules
designed to benefit a particular group, bear the burden of justifying
departure from the traditionally accepted norms governing allocation
of criminal sentences. With this general approach in mind, the next
section considers some of the particularly difficult issues posed by the
sentencing of female offenders under the federal guidelines scheme.
C. FEMALE OFFENDERS AND THE GUIDELINES SCHEME: ISSUES OF
SPECIAL CONCERN
1. Pregnancy
One especially difficult sentencing issue posed by female offend-
ers is how pregnancy is to be taken into account at sentencing. The
guidelines do not specifically mention pregnancy. In the leading ap-
pellate case on the issue, United States v. Pozzy,8 7 the First Circuit held
that pregnancy is not an appropriate basis for downward departure
from the applicable guidelines range. In the absence of any specific
("Sentences... disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense create a disrespect for
the law.").
85 Cf Elizabeth Rapaport, The Death Penalty and GenderDiscrimination, 25 LAw & Soc'y
REv. 367, 368 (1991).
86 See, e.g., Samuel H. Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved Punishment: An Essay on Choice,
Character and Responsibility, 67 IND. LJ. 719, 740 (1992).
87 902 F.2d 133, 138-39 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 943 (1990).
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guidance on the pregnancy issue, the Court looked to § 5H1.4 of the
guidelines, which provides that a defendant's physical impairment is a
basis for departure only in extraordinary cases. The court concluded
that the language of this section, in light of the Commission's silence
on pregnancy, established that the Commission rejected pregnancy as
an independent basis for departure.88 The court also noted that preg-
nancy "is neither atypical nor unusual," and hence not extraordinary
for purposes of § 5H1.4.89 Finally, the Court expressed concern that a
downward departure for pregnancy might encourage female offend-
ers to become pregnant in order to influence sentencing outcomes.90
The Commission has taken no steps, since Pozzy, to reassess the
guidelines' silence on the question of pregnancy. Thus, the guide-
lines' approach to pregnancy remains one of formal neutrality. The
question is, of course, whether such an approach is appropriate in
light of the gendered effects of pregnancy.
Equal treatment of men and women in light of the biological and
social realities of pregnancy has been a vexing issue for courts, legisla-
tures, and theorists.91 In Michael M. v. Superior Court,92 the Supreme
88 Id. at 139. ("We think the Commission was fully aware that some convicted felons are
pregnant at the time of sentencing. If it had thought that pregnancy was a sentencing
factor to be considered, the Commission would have said so.")
Commentators have criticized the court for construing the Commission's silence as an
implicit rejection of pregnancy. See Raeder, supra note 73, at 947. Nevertheless, the First
Circuit's conclusion about the Commission's views was accurate.
89 Pozzy, 902 F.2d at 139.
90 Id. The court explained:
It must also be noted that defendant became pregnant after she and her husband
were arrested and charged with drug trafficking. We agree.. . "that to allow a depar-
ture downward for pregnancy could set a precedent that would have dangerous conse-
quences in the future, sending an obvious message to all female defendants that
pregnancy 'is a way out'"
I& at 139.
While the use of pregnancy to thwart criminal justice aims might strike some as far-
fetched, experience suggests otherwise. In the course of its deliberations over the preg-
nancy issue, the Commission was presented with informal testimony that a well-established
pattern of sentencing leniency for pregnant offenders in some states had prompted drug
dealers to actively recruit poor, pregnant women as drug couriers. See also United States v.
Arize, 792 F. Supp. 920, 921 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (acknowledging risks in granting downward
departures from the guidelines for pregnant drug couriers because "[t~he general deter-
rence effect of punishment would be reduced if drug couriers were routinely sentenced
leniently").
91 For example, the Supreme Court struggled with the issues of pregnancy and gender
discrimination in the context of employment benefits in the landmark discrimination cases
of Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) and General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125
(1976). These cases and others dealing with pregnancy stimulated extensive academic
commentary, much of which was critical of the Court's analysis. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 78,
at 30-31; Law, supra note 78; Littleton, supra note 77, at 1305-06, 1326-30; Williams, supra
note 74.
92 450 U.S. 464 (1981). In Michael M., the Court upheld California statutory rape legis-
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Court recognized, in the context of statutory rape, the permissibility
of treating women and men in a facially unequal manner to account
for the possibility of pregnancy. Whether such special treatment of
convicted pregnant offenders is good policy in the context of criminal
sentencing remains unclear. The Court's ruling in Michael M. pro-
vides no guidance on this issue.
While a pregnant offender and a non-pregnant offender (male or
female) clearly are not similarly situated, it does not necessarily follow
that this is a difference relevant for sentencing purposes. Pregnancy
does not appear to relate to the sentencing purposes highlighted by
the Sentencing Reform Act. It is difficult to imagine a case in which
the defendant's status as a mother-to-be is relevant to an objective as-
sessment of the seriousness of her offense or to her culpability for that
offense. In this sense, pregnancy has no bearing on the determina-
tion of the deserved punishment for the offense. Nor is special, more
lenient treatment of pregnant offenders justifiable on the basis of
crime control considerations. Unlike certain other physical condi-
tions which may warrant downward departure from the applicable
guidelines sentence,93 pregnancy is not incapacitating in the sense
that it does not restrict the individual's ability to commit additional
offenses. The pregnant offender is free to engage in criminal activity
throughout most of her pregnancy, as well as after completion of her
pregnancy. Moreover, downward departures on the basis of preg-
nancy might have a marginally negative impact on general
deterrence. 9
4
To the extent that sentence mitigation for pregnancy is justified,
it must be justified on the basis of exogenous utilitarian considera-
tions, such as the physical well-being of the offender or her baby.
However, barring unusual circumstances, it is difficult to make a peno-
logical case for leniency on the basis of pregnancy. From a purely
medical standpoint, pregnancy is analogous to a number of physical
conditions suffered by inmates, male and female. The Commission
has taken the view that such physical impairments can be accommo-
dated by the Bureau of Prisons and should not interfere with the ser-
lation that imposed penalties on males convicted of having sexual intercourse with under-
age females, but left unpunished female intercourse with underage males. It noted that
the differential treatment of males and females served the statute's purpose of preventing
teenage pregnancy. Id. at 474 n.10.
93 See, e.g., United States v. Maltese, No. 90 CR 87-19, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8403 (N.D.
Ill. June 18, 1993) (downward departure under § 5H1.4 based on the defendant's liver
cancer); United States v. Velasquez, 762 F. Supp. 39 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (downward departure
based on defendant's cancer).
94 See Arize, 792 F. Supp. at 921 (recognizing potential reduction in general deterrence
if lenient treatment of pregnant drug couriers became routine).
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vice of an appropriate term of imprisonment.95 A contrary approach
would risk diminishing the import of the criminal sanction and would
result in disparate treatment of offenders convicted of similar crimes.
Moreover, because pregnancy is a temporary condition, a sentencing
judge may delay sentencing in order to permit birth to be completed
before the defendant serves her sentence, thereby obviating the need
to impose a lesser sentence to account for the offender's pregnancy.
96
Thus, pregnancy poses no insurmountable obstacle to service of a
sentence warranted by traditional penological purposes. Special treat-
ment of pregnant defendants in the sentencing context could be seen
as exalting motherhood at the expense of the personal responsibility
of female offenders for their criminal conduct. This demeans women
as responsible citizens.
2. Family Ties
Another difficult gender-related issue in guidelines sentencing is
the treatment of parenthood, particularly single parenthood. This is
clearly a gendered issue; eighty-eight percent of all single parents are
female. 97 Although the Commission does not collect data on offend-
ers' single parent status, inmate survey results collected by Myrna Ra-
eder indicate that single parenthood is not uncommon among female
inmates and that female inmates are more likely than male inmates to
have primary child care responsibilities.
98
Single parenthood, like pregnancy, is not specifically addressed
in the guidelines. However, § 5H1.6 of the guidelines provides that a
defendant's family ties and circumstances are "not ordinarily relevant"
in assessing whether a departure is appropriate.9 9 Although there is
substantial variation in the case law interpreting this provision,1 0 0 the
95 See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4 (physical condition not ordinarily relevant in decision to depart
from guidelines).
96 Of course, this raises the question of whether incarceration unduly interferes with
the bond between mother and child after birth, and whether such interference wouldjus-
tify sentence mitigation. This problem is, however, more appropriately characterized as
one of parenthood or family ties, rather than pregnancy, and it is addressed in the next
section.
97 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MARITAL STATUS AND LING AR-
RANGEMEN-rs xi (1992).
98 Raeder, supra note 73, at 951-53.
99 U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6. By using the words "not ordinarily relevant," rather than "never
relevant," the Commission left to the courts the discretion to determine, on a case-by-case
basis, whether unusual family ties or circumstances would justify a sentence below that
applicable to otherwise similarly situated offenders.
100 Some courts have interpreted this provision strictly, placing significant restrictions
on the ability of district courts to depart downward on the basis of family circumstances.
See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 930 F.2d 526, 529 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 171
(1991) (holding that family circumstances are never relevant where probation or a fine is
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prevailing view in the appellate courts is that single parenthood is not
itself an adequate basis for a downward departure.' 0 ' In other words,
the courts generally have held that single parenthood is not suffi-
ciently extraordinary to fall outside the heartland of cases covered by
the guidelines.
The Commission's adoption of the § 5H1.6 limitations on consid-
ering family circumstances at sentencing can be traced directly to the
language and legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act. In 28
U.S.C. § 994(e), Congress specified that it is generally inappropriate
for judges to consider factors such as employment, family ties, and
community ties when they determine a proper sentence. The legisla-
tive history indicates that these provisions were motivated by Con-
gress' concern about the biases associated with the traditional practice
of lenient sentencing of defendants with good employment prospects,
and strong community.and family ties. While well-intended, these fac-
tors were used to justify light sentences for white, middle class defend-
ants with strong ties to visibly intact families, and lengthy prison terms
for unemployed, unmarried minority defendants who had committed
offenses of similar seriousness. Reducing reliance on factors such as
family ties was designed to redress this disparity. 0 2
The Sentencing Reform Act's mandate for a guidelines' structure
that de-emphasizes personal offender characteristics, such as family
ties, has been criticized extensively, both from traditional and feminist
perspectives.10 3 For example, some commentators advocate a pre-
not a sentencing option authorized by the guidelines).
Others, while acknowledging the availability of departures under § 5H1.6, have inter-
preted its scope fairly narrowly. See, e.g., United States v. Shortt, 919 F.2d 1325, 1328 (8th
Cir. 1990) (impact of defendant's incarceration on family farm and wife's history of drug
and alcohol abuse insufficiently extraordinary to warrant downward departure); United
States v. Goff, 907 F.2d 1441, 1446 (4th Cir. 1990) (mother of 3 minor children ineligible
for downward departure).
Finally, other courts have been more permissive in interpreting § 5HI.6. See, e.g.,
United States v. Alba, 933 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1991) (upholding downward departure for
defendant with 2 young children and a disabled father); United States v. Handy, 752 F.
Supp. 561 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (downward departure for single mother of minor children).
101 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 908 F.2d 396, 398-99 (8th Cir. 1990) (single
mother of infant not entitled to downward departure); Goff 907 F.2d at 1446 (mother of
minor children ineligible for downward departure); United States v. Sailes, 872 F.2d 735,
739 (6th Cir. 1989) (same). See generally ROGER W. HAMJESJR. Er AL., FEDERAL SETrENCrNG
GUIDEUNES HANDBOOK 522 (1992) ("But generally, the courts have held that it is improper
to depart downward based on a defendant's responsibilities for the care of her children.").
102 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 18, at 174-75, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3357-58.
103 See, e.g., Eleanor Bush, Considering the Defendant's Children at Sentencing, 2 FED. SENT.
Rr 194 (1990); Theresa Walker Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines Meeting Congressional Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY LJ. 393,
437-38 (1991); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1938, 1953-54 (1988); Raeder, supra note 73, at 953;
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sumptive downward departure for all offenders with primary parent-
ing responsibility for minor children.'0 4 However, whether judges
should factor parental responsibilities into sentencing, and if so, how,
is best approached in a two-pronged fashion: (1) as a descriptive mat-
ter, whether recognition of single parenthood as a basis for downward
departure is consistent with the guidelines and the goals of the Sen-
tencing Reform Act; and (2) as a normative matter, whether recogni-
tion of such a departure would result in a more just and effective
sentencing policy.
a. Family Ties in the Guidelines Scheme
As noted, the Commission specified in § 5H1.6 that family ties
are "not ordinarily relevant" in assessing the appropriateness of depar-
ture. By and large, appellate courts have interpreted § 5H1.6 as fore-
closing departure solely on the basis of single parenthood, concluding
that it is not an "extraordinary" family situation within the meaning of
§ 5H1.6.105 As the Fourth Circuit explained in United States v. Brand:
A sole, custodial parent is not a rarity in today's society, and imprisoning
such a parent will by definition separate the parent from the children. It
is apparent that in many cases the other parent may be unable or unwill-
ing to care for the children, and that the children will have to live with
relatives, friends, or even in foster homes....
This situation, though unfortunate, is simply not out of the ordinary.
106
Myrna Raeder argues that this characterization of single parent of-
fenders (particularly females) is inapt:
The present quandary over the feasibility of granting departures to preg-
nant women and single mothers ultimately results from the circuits un-
necessarily limiting their interpretation of the Section 5H1 factors by
defining the opposite of "ordinarily" as "extraordinarily."... There are
other adjectives which could also be used to describe a case as not ordi-
nary, including uncommon and infrequent. Clearly, single mothers are
atypical of the majority of offenders being sentenced.
10 7
Raeder correctly notes that single mothers are not typical of the
overall offender population. Moreover, judicial efforts to distinguish
"ordinary" cases from "extraordinary" cases have been unsatisfactory.
Identifying "extraordinary" cases is extremely difficult, given the in-
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem is Uniformity, Not
Disparity, 29 Am. GRIM. L. REv. 833, 858-61 (1992); Susan E. Ellingstad, Note, The Sentencing
Guidelines: Dowmward Departures Based on a Defendant's Extraordinary Family Ties and Responsi-
bilities, 76 MINN. L. REv. 957 (1992).
104 Raeder, supra note 73, at 962.
105 Johnson, 908 F.2d at 398-99; Goff 907 F.2d at 1446; Sailes, 872 F.2d at 739.
106 United States v. Brand, 907 F.2d 31, 33 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1014 (1990).
107 Raeder, supra note 73, at 955-56.
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herent imprecision of the term. In addition, this focus on whether a
particular fact pattern is sufficiently "extraordinary" to justify depar-
ture from the guidelines range has tended to distract judges from the
more important task of evaluating whether the applicable guidelines
in a given case furthers the underlying purposes of guidelines sentenc-
ing.108 Nevertheless, the courts' general conclusion-that single par-
ent status is not an adequate basis for departure-is consonant with
the Commission's approach. The Commission is aware of the
problems posed in sentencing single parents but has structured the
guidelines to permit downward departure for them only if other miti-
gating factors exist.10 9
Both Congress' guidance in the Sentencing Reform Act and con-
siderations of sentencing policy have influenced the Commission's ap-
proach. Specifically, the Commission responded to section 994(e),
which requires it to "assure that the guidelines and policy statements,
in recommending a term of imprisonment or length of a term of im-
prisonment, reflect the general inappropriateness of considering the
education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and re-
sponsibilities, and community ties of the defendant."110
Critics have argued that the Commission has relied too exten-
sively on section 994(e), ignoring other provisions in the statute which
emphasize the need to account for offender characteristics in sentenc-
ing.'1 ' These critics correctly assert that the Act has provisions that
are inconsistent with the Commission's approach. This is partly the
result of the ambiguities in the Act, which arose from compromises
among legislators with divergent views on sentencing policy." 2 The
Commission might have interpreted its mandate somewhat differ-
ently, given the conflicting provisions in the Act. Moreover, in section
994(d), Congress instructed the Commission to consider whether a
host of factors, including family ties and responsibilities, "have any rel-
evance" to sentencing and to take them into account "only to the ex-
tent that they do have relevance." Thus, even though Congress
admonished the Commission regarding the general inappropriate-
ness of including factors such as family ties in the guidelines, it argua-
bly gave the Commission the authority to determine whether the
guidelines should account for such factors in some specified con-
108 See Marc Miller, Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. CAYi L. Rzv. 413, 458-63 (1992).
109 Even though the guidelines do not permit downward departures for single parents,
they permit consideration of family ties in determining a sentence within the guidelines
sentencing range. See, e.g., United States v. Brady, 895 F.2d 538, 543 (9th Cir. 1990).
110 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (1988).
III See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 103, at 859-61.
112 See Stith & Koh, supra note 59, at 283-87.
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texts." 3 In short, the Commission might have the authority under the
Act to permit departures for single parents, if it determines that such
departures would be sound sentencing policy.
b. Should Parental Status be Factored into Guidelines Sentencing?
The question of whether courts should factor parental status into
their sentences is a difficult one. Those that argue for mitigating
sentences on the basis of parental status assert that excessive incarcer-
ation of single parents disrupts the parent/child relationship to the
detriment of the child. They contend that the social costs of this dis-
ruption, both direct and indirect, outweigh the benfits of incarcera-
tion and thus warrant mitigation of an otherwise applicable
sentence.1 1 4 They also argue that incarcerated single mothers receive
a "double punishment." Not only are they incarcerated but they are
separated from their children and often lose their parental rights."
5
From this perspective, facially neutral treatment of single mothers is
not equal treatment at all, but rather results in disparate gender
impact.
c. Collateral Consequences and Double Punishment
The desire to adjust criminal sentences to reflect collateral conse-
quences of conviction is understandable. Different personal circum-
stances cause a given term of imprisonment to fall more heavily on
some than on others. This is arguably the case for single mothers.
According to Eleanor Bush:
If the "same" sentence has an inconsistent impact on two different de-
fendants, then considering the two sentences as equivalent is unjust. An
incarcerative sentence may have a distinctly different impact on a parent
than it has on a non-parent. For example, in many states, incarceration
constitutes a ground for termination of parental rights. A two year
prison sentence does not equal two years in prison accompanied by a
permanent loss of child custody. Justice requires considering the conse-
quences of a sentence for the defendant's children where they lead to
such different effective quantities of punishment. 116
Despite the simple, intuitive appeal of this argument, it leads
113 See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 18, at 175, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3357 ("It
should be emphasized, however, that the Committee decided to describe [the factors in
section 994(e)] as 'generally inappropriate,' rather than always inappropriate ... in order
to permit the Sentencing Commission to evaluate their relevance, and to give them appli-
cation in particular situations found to warrant their consideration.").
114 See, e.g., Bush, supra note 103; Karle & Sager, supra note 103, at 437-38; Raeder, supra
note 73, at 953; Ellingstad, supra note 103, at 980-81.
115 See, e.g., Adela Beckerman, Women in Prison: The Conflict Between Confinement and Pa-
rental Rights, 18 Soc.Jusr. 171, 180 (1991); Bush, supra note 103, at 194.
116 Bush, supra note 103, at 194.
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down a dangerous path. First, it assumes the ability to compare the
"effective quantities" of punishment imposed on differently situated
defendants as a result of facially equal terms of incarceration. Econo-
mists, however, tell us that it is virtually impossible to engage in the
kind of intersubjective utility comparisons necessary to evaluate the
comparative disutility of imprisonment among different offenders?" 7
Moreover, once people accept the permissibility of adjusting pun-
ishment on the basis of such intersubjective comparisons, there is no
logical stopping point. A variety of situations create potential reasons
for imposing lesser sentences of imprisonment. For instance, offend-
ers often lose their businesses, wind up divorced, or even get deported
as a result of their convictions. These serious collateral harms could
justify a shorter sentence. Age is another potential consideration. A
ten year sentence arguably is more burdensome for a sixty-year-old
male than for a twenty-year-old female, because the elderly offender
will spend a greater percentage of his expected life span behind bars.
Alternatively, counsel for the twenty-year-old could argue that ten
years stolen from her youth is far worse than ten years served by the
older man. Permitting these intersubjective comparisons to alter an
otherwise applicable sentence leads to a free-for-all of sentence indi-
vidualization, each defendant arguing that her incarceration would be
more painful than that of other defendants. The result would be un-
fettered judicial discretion and discrimination in application.' 18 Re-
call, it was this very logic which often resulted in the incarceration of
minority and disadvantaged offenders, while white offenders were sen-
tenced to probation. Some judges believed that white, middle-class
offenders suffered hardship and stigma from incarceration that poor,
minority offenders did. not. The resulting disparity and discrimina-
tion prompted the calls for reform that resulted in the Sentencing
Reform Act." 9
117 See, e.g., Lionel Robbins, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment 48 ECON. J.
635 (1938). See generally KENmNHJ. ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 9 (2d
ed. 1963).
118 See, e.g., VON HIRsc-, supra note 16, at 89-90.
The assessment of severity... should be standardized: the focus should be on how
unpleasant the punishment characteristically is. Such standardization is necessary as a
limit on discretion .... It is also needed as a safeguard against class justice. Judges
sometimes impose different penalties on persons convicted of similar crimes, in the
hope of producing equivalent amounts of discomfort: the middle-class person is put
on probation and the ghetto youth jailed for the same infraction, on the theory that
the former's sensitivities are greater.
Id
119 See, e.g., Edward M. Kennedy, Criminal Sentencing: A Game of Chance, 60 JUDICATURE
208, 210 (1976) (characterizing sentencing system as "a national scandal").
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d. Avoiding Collateral Damage: Children and Incarceration
Another argument in favor of departure for single parents fo-
cuses not on the offender, but on her children. As Myrna Raeder
argues, incarceration of single parents results in severe disruption of
children's lives. They may be placed in foster care, or separated from
their siblings.120 These disruptions, and the ensuing lack of parental
guidance, can lead to behavioral problems, and even an increased
likelihood of future criminal activity. 121 Raeder makes a plausible util-
itarian case for taking these considerations into account:
122
Any cost benefit analysis would seem to dictate that children be consid-
ered in the sentencing decision, particularly when societal costs regard-
ing any future criminality of the children are weighed.... Other societal
costs that should be considered might include foster care to replace the
incarcerated parent, permanent dissolution of the family when the in-
carceration provides grounds for terminating parental rights, and the
child's dependence upon government aid.
123
Unquestionably, the imprisonment of single parents has significant so-
cial costs. Moreover, no one wants to see innocent children suffer as a
result of a parent's incarceration. Yet, a general rule discouraging in-
carceration of single parents has troubling implications.
Consider, for instance, defendants "A" and "B," two females em-
ployed in the personnel section of an agency of the federal govern-
ment. They are convicted of theft of government funds, arising from
a kickback scheme in which each defendant altered other employees'
pay documents (effectively creating unauthorized pay raises) in ex-
change for a percentage of the increased pay. The defendants partici-
pated equally in the criminal activity, and each received
approximately the same amount of money-neither woman has a
prior criminal record.
Based on the nature of the offense, the amount of loss, and the
criminal history of the defendants, the applicable guidelines sentenc-
ing range for each defendant is forty-six to fifty-seven months impris-
onment. Accordingly, the judge sentences defendant "A," who is
childless, to forty-six months in prison. Defendant "B," however is a
single mother with three minor children. As a result, she receives a
substantial downward departure, and the judge sentences her to six
120 Raeder, supra note 73, at 953.
121 [&
122 I& at 959. Raeder emphasizes both the direct social costs of imprisonment of single
parents (i.e., foster care) and the more speculative indirect social costs (future criminality).
Id- at 953, 959. In short, she concludes that the "disadvantage to children who may have
less supervision and care has societal costs which can outweigh any sentencing advantage."
Id. at 961.
123 I& at 959 (footnotes omitted).
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months home confinement, to allow her to care for her children.
The sentences imposed in this example do not serve the principal
purposes of sentencing articulated in the Sentencing Reform Act.
Further, they clearly violate desert principles. Although these defend-
ants do not have the same child care responsibilities, they are equally
culpable. Yet one received a lengthy prison sentence while the other
did not. As this example illustrates, taking children into account in
sentencing shifts the focus from issues of offense seriousness and of-
fender culpability to considerations exogenous to .these sentencing
purposes. The result is an obvious sentencing disparity. Defendant
"A" will have to serve a prison sentence nearly four years longer than
that served by "B," her equally culpable codefendant, simply because
she does not have children.
Of course, punishment in our society is not totally desert-based.
The Sentencing Reform Act mandated that crime control principles-
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation-also play an important
sentencing role.12 4 However, the disparity in sentencing between de-
fendants "A" and "B" similarly cannot be explained by crime control
considerations. Incapacitation and rehabilitation are obviously not
served here; defendant "A" is not necessarily more dangerous, or less
amenable to rehabilitation than "B." Moreover, these sentences ar-
guably undermine deterrence principles, because they send out the
message that potential offenders who have parenting responsibilities
can expect to be treated leniently by the courts.125
This is not to say that exogenous utilitarian concerns, such as the
impact of sentencing on children, should be unimportant in allocat-
ing criminal penalties. For example, § 5H1.1 of the guidelines per-
mits downward departure for defendants who are "elderly and
infirm." This provision reflects an exogenous utilitarian considera-
tion-the judgment that the relative costs of imprisonment of such
offenders, including medical expenses, outweighs the benefits of in-
carceration. 126 However, such exogenous considerations are rarely
sufficiently important to outweigh either culpability or crime control
considerations in the allocation of sentences. Indeed, § 5H1.1 can be
explained in terms of incapacitative purposes: the physical limitations
of elderly and infirm offenders make them less likely than the typical
124 See supra notes 10 to 15 and accompanying text.
125 Cf United States v. Arize, 792 F. Supp. 920, 921 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (acknowledging
reduction in deterrent effect if pregnant drug couriers were routinely sentenced
leniently).
126 See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1 (downward departure appropriate for elderly and infirm offend-
ers "where a form of punishment such as home confinement might be equally efficient as
and less costly than incarceration") (emphasis added).
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offender to recidivate.
In sum, those who advocate the consideration of exogenous utili-
tarian factors in the allocation of criminal penalties bear a heavy bur-
den in justifying a departure from reliance on the sentencing
purposes identified by Congress in the Sentencing Reform Act. It is
unclear whether the impact of incarceration on children is a sufficient
justification. The argument for across-the-board mitigation under
these circumstances assumes that maintaining the family unit is neces-
sarily in the best interest of the children. However, this argument may
not be true in all cases.127 A criminal conviction does not necessarily
make someone an unfit parent. The unfortunate reality, however, is
that many criminal defendants are less than exemplary parents. A
large percentage abuse either drugs or alcohol or both, 128 and many
have been involved in serious criminal activity that could pose risks to
children. Thus, keeping these families together is not necessarily in
the best interest of the children. And any net social gain from more
lenient sentencing of single parents may not outweigh other sentenc-
ing considerations.
Feminists might also consider the gender role implications of tak-
ing parental responsibilities into account in sentencing. It is undis-
puted that the gendered nature of child rearing causes children of
some female offenders to be disadvantaged relative to the children of
their male counterparts. Therefore, a policy designed to equalize this
situation, through mitigation of the sentences of offenders with pri-
mary child care responsibilities, may unintentionally reinforce gender
stereotypes. Such a policy would effectively use the criminal law to
reward women for their status as mothers (or, alternatively, to punish
women for not having children). It would say in effect, "you have vio-
lated the criminal law, but we'll overlook that so you can do what you
are supposed to do-care for your children." This denies single-
mother offenders the status of full moral agents and disregards the
social contributions of childless women, whose employment and com-
munity ties are not given the same consideration in sentencing.
The gendered nature of child care responsibilities and the femi-
nization of poverty are grave public policy concerns that must be ad-
dressed in order to achieve a more equitable society. It is not clear,
however, that the criminal sentencing system is the appropriate institu-
127 See, e.g., United States v. Sailes, 872 F.2d 735, 739 (6th Cir. 1989) (upholding district
court's refusal to depart downwardly under § 5H1.6, noting the lower court's "apparent
belief that the proper development of Mrs. Sailes' younger children might be facilitated by
the children's removal from her direct influence for a time.").
128 See BuREAu OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICs-1992 459 (1993).
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tion to address these pressing problems.
3. Coercion, Duress, and Abuse
Another issue with gender implications is the extent to which
guidelines should account for physical or psychological coercion or
abuse by male codefendants. 129 Unlike pregnancy and family ties, the
presence of coercion or abuse is part of the traditional assessment of a
defendant's culpability under the criminal law, and thus fits more
comfortably within the framework of traditional sentencing purposes.
There appears to be ample room in the guidelines for judges to use
departure to account for the most obvious forms of coercion and
abuse.
For example, policy statement 5K2.12 provides that "serious coer-
cion, blackmail or duress, under circumstances not amounting to a
complete defense" is a basis for downward departure.13 0 Courts have
employed this section to justify downward departures for battered fe-
male offenders. For example, in United States v. Johnson,131 the court
vacated and remanded the sentences of several female participants in
a drug trafficking conspiracy headed by a violent, male drug lord.
The Ninth Circuit ordered the district court to consider, inter alia,
whether downward departures for duress under § 5K2.12 should be
granted. As the court explained, a defendant need not make a show-
ing of duress equivalent to that required for a complete defense.' 3 2
Further, the fact that the defendant could have escaped does not pre-
clude mitigation:
33
Given the court's apparent acceptance of [the defendant's] credibility as
to her sad and savage treatment by male abusers and given the court's
recognition that [the defendant] had been involved with a manipulative,
violent, brutal drug lord, the court did have the discretion to depart
downward if the court found that [defendant] had been subject to coer-
cion, even though with effort she could have escaped.'
34
The court in Johnson was sensitive to the gendered nature of duress,
expressly noting that "gender is also a factor to be considered" as one
of the defendant's personal characteristics in determining whether
the defendant's fear is well-grounded, and whether there is a reason-
129 Obviously, male defendants may be subject to coercion, but physical, psychological,
and social differences between men and women make female crime more likely than male
crime to be the result of coercion. See Raeder, supra note 73, at 973.
130 U.S.S.G. § 5K2.12.
131 956 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1992).
132 Id. at 898 (citing United States v. Cheape, 889 F.2d 477, 480 (3d Cir. 1989)).
133 Id. at 901-02.
134 Id. at 902.
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able opportunity to escape.' 3 5 Other courts have also shown a willing-
ness to depart downwardly from the guidelines to account for
duress. 13
6
Courts may also use § 5H1.3 and § 5K2.13 to reduce the
sentences of battered or coerced female offenders. Section 5H1.3
provides that the defendant's mental or emotional condition is not
"ordinarily" relevant in assessing whether departure is appropriate.
However, courts have interpreted it to permit departure for "ex-
traordinary" mental or emotional conditions, including those involv-
ing abused female offenders. For example, in United States v. Roe,
a37
the Ninth Circuit held that sentencing judges could consider the long-
term abuse the defendant suffered in deciding whether to depart
from the guidelines. The court recounted the defendant's horrific
history of childhood physical and sexual abuse, as well as later abuse
by pimps, customers, and boyfriends. It concluded that such ex-
traordinary abuse might justify a downward departure under the
guidelines.
Section 5K2.10, which permits departure if the "victim's wrongful
conduct contributed significantly to provoking the offense behavior,"
may also allow judges to mitigate sentences for battery or coercion.
This section encompasses the traditional Battered Woman Syndrome
defense-a defendant's violent reprisal against an abuser.'3 8 Federal
courts rarely use it, because it is applicable principally in murder,
manslaughter, and assault cases, which are typically tried in state
court.'39 Nevertheless, federal courts have applied this provision in
cases involving battered female defendants. For example, in United
States v. Whitetai4140 the court vacated and remanded for considera-
tion a departure under § 5K2.10 a case in which the defendant was
convicted of the second-degree murder of her live-in boyfriend.
Moreover, downward departure under § 5K2.0 is not limited to
cases of severe physical abuse. In United States v. Yellow Earrings,14' the
court affirmed a downward departure for assault based on victim mis-
conduct where the defendant knifed a man who had attempted to
rape her. The court determined that the victim's verbal abuse of the
defendant, combined with his drunkenness and relative size and
135 Id. at 898.
136 See, e.g., United States v. Mickens, 977 F.2d 69, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1992).
137 976 F.2d 1216, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 1992).
138 See, e.g., ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATrERED WOMEN KILL (1987).
139 In fiscal year 1992, these offenses accounted for just 1.2% of cases sentenced under
the federal guidelines. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 3, Table 13.
140 956 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1992).
141 891 F.2d 650 (8th Cir. 1992).
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strength, were sufficient to warrant departure.142 The court was also
influenced by the fact that the defendant had previously been physi-
cally abused by a drunken, male relative. 143 Thus, the court in Yellow
Earrings was sensitive to the gender issues underlying that case.
The principal limitation on these departures is that there must be
some nexus between the victimization of the defendant and the com-
mission of the crime. For example, in United States v. Perkins,144 the
D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded a downward departure for a fe-
male suffering from dependent personality disorder. The court ex-
plained that such a departure may be justified only if the sentencing
judge finds a causal link between the defendant's condition and the
commission of the offense.' 45 This nexus requirement follows logi-
cally from the culpability-based nature of these departures. If the de-
fendant's victimization did not influence the offense behavior, any
departure is merely a "victim" discount, imposed out of pity for the
defendant, rather than out of a sense that a lesser sentence is de-
served. Such departures would undermine the moral agency of their
recipients and would not serve the purposes of sentencing. 46 How-
ever, courts should not impose nexus requirements that are too strin-
gent. This could result in unfairly harsh sentences for defendants
who deserve mitigation and adversely affect female offenders, who ap-
pear to be disproportionately subject to coercion and abuse by co-
defendants.
4. Dominance, Manipulationt, and Role in the Offense
The possibility that the criminal behavior of a female offender
results from some form of dominance or manipulation, falling short
of physical abuse or serious psychological coercion, is a particularly
troublesome issue for guidelines sentencing. As Raeder has pointed
out, a review of published cases reveals that some female criminals,
particularly those involved in drug trafficking offenses, are romanti-
cally involved with male co-defendants. 147 Many of these offenders
play only a minor role in the illegal activity148 and might be less culpa-
ble than those committing similar offenses on their own, or in concert
with co-equals. To the extent that guidelines sentencing fails to per-
142 Id. at 654.
143 Id
144 963 F.2d 1523, 1528 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
145 See also United States v. Frazier, 979 F.2d 1227, 1230 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Desormeaux, 952 F.2d 182, 185 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Vela, 927 F.2d 197, 199
(5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 214 (1991).
146 Cf., supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
147 Raeder, supra note 73, at 977.
148 Id. at 977-78.
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mitjudges to take this subordination adequately into account, 49 it has
a disparate impact on female offenders.
Obviously, these women cannot be absolved completely of crimi-
nal liability, yet assessing their culpability is often difficult. The Com-
mission has wresfled with the issue of the non-coercive domination of
female offenders by co-defendant males and its role in sentencing.
Unfortunately, to this point the Commission has been unable to de-
vise a satisfactory way to take this factor into account in an express
fashion, while remaining faithful to the gender neutrality requirement
of the statute. Specifically, the Commission has found it difficult to
articulate a departure for "bad romantic judgment." The risks in-
volved in devising an express adjustment or departure for this type of
situation are highlighted by United States v. Mast.'50 In that case,
which involved a female bank robber dubbed the "Miss America ban-
dit," the district judge ordered a significant downward departure be-
cause of the defendant's domination, even though it did not amount
to physical coercion. Thejudge's comments reveal a paternalistic atti-
tude toward the defendant: "men have exercised traditional control
over the activities of women, and I'm not going to ignore that, no
matter how much flak I get from women's lib," and "I think it's a fact
of life that men can exercise a Svengali influence over women," and
"women are a soft touch, particularly if sex is involved."151 The judge
then concluded that the guidelines "should have taken into considera-
tion the possibility that in some cases, a girl from a good background,
from a good family, came [sic] under a malevolent influence and gui-
dance of a bum, then gets caught doing things for him."152
This case demonstrates the potential costs involved in countering
the gendered effects of sentencing through direct, express mitigation.
It perpetuates inappropriate gender stereotypes, denies the defend-
ant's fundamental moral agency, and introduces socioeconomic
biases. 1
53
149 The guidelines permit adjustment of up to eight offense levels-four up and four
down-to reflect the offender's role in the offense. See U.S.S.G. §§ 3B1.1 (Aggravating
Role), 3B1.2 (Mitigating Role). It could be argued, however, that the four-level mitigating
role adjustment is insufficient to reflect the culpability of a female who played a minimal
role in the offense and whose participation in the criminal scheme may have resulted from
her romantic involvement with a more culpable co-conspirator. See, e.g., Raeder, supra
note 73, at 977-78.
150 No. CR-88-0720-AAH-1 (C.D. Cal. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 925 F.2d 1472 (9th
Cir. 1991).
151 See Miss America Bandit Crowned With Light Sentence OPRGONIN May 11, 1989, at C7.
152 Id
153 Note how the judge emphasized the defendant's "good" family background. Query
whether a poor, minority defendant would have received the same downward departure as
this attractive, former cheerleader. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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The Commission has chosen not to directly address the domi-
nance issue, or the presence of bad romantic judgment in prompting
criminal involvement. Instead, most offenders must rely on the more
general mitigating role adjustments for individuals playing minor
roles,154 or upon the availability of a downward departure under
§ 5K2.0, the guidelines' general departure provision. But some liti-
gants have been successful. For example, some district courts have
recognized female subordination as a basis for departure. In United
States v. Naylor,155 the court granted a substantial downward departure
to a female whose participation in the offense arose from her roman-
tic relationship with a manipulative, older male co-defendant. Such
cases are, however, comparatively rare. The degree of subordination
necessary to obtain a departure under the present framework is diffi-
cult to establish.
In theory, role adjustments offer a more promising mechanism
for achieving proportionality in sentencing this type of defendant. If
the offender's involvement in the offense is peripheral, she should get
a two to four level reduction in her offense.156 In practice, however,
role adjustments may provide only a relatively limited tool for sentenc-
ing mitigation. 157 For example, courts will sometimes find the four
level reduction for minimal role inapplicable, if the defendant partici-
pates continuously in a conspiracy. 58 Moreover, in drug trafficking
cases, which account for a significant percentage of cases in which
role adjustments are granted, mandatory minimum sentences often
limit the impact of role adjustments on the applicable guidelines
sentence.1 59
a. The Special Problems Posed by Drug Trafficking Cases
Under the current system, drug trafficking cases create distinctive
problems in the proper calibration of sentences. As a result, some
women are punished more severely than they would have been under
154 See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.
155 735 F. Supp. 928 (D. Minn. 1990).
156 See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.
157 On the other hand, plea-related manipulation of guidelines factors, such as role,
sometimes results in unwarranted sentence mitigation. See infra notes 16586 and accom-
panying text.
158 See, e.g., United States v. Pofahl, 990 F.2d 1456, 1484-85 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct 266 (1993) (defendant acted as a drug courier on several occasions); United
States v. Tabares, 951 F.2d 405, 410 (1st Cir. 1991) (continued presence of drugs and
money in apartment defendant shared with boyfriend prevented finding of minimal role).
See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment. (n.2) (stating that minimal role adjustment be used infre-
quently, for example, where the defendant was a courier or offloader involved in a single
shipment or transaction).
159 See infra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
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a more discretionary regime.' 60 The root of these problems is the
pervasive effect of mandatory minimum sentences. These mandato-
ries anchor the guidelines sentences, which incorporate the
mandatory penalties for given quantities of drugs and extrapolate
sentences for additional drug quantities.
161
The impact of mandatory minimums was exacerbated by Con-
gress' decision in 1988 to extend them to offenders convicted of drug
trafficking conspiracies. 162 As a result, courts may determine the
sentences of federal drug offenders more by the size of the conspiracy
in which they are a participant, rather than by their role in the con-
spiracy. Female offenders, in particular, may have been adversely af-
fected, Females traditionally have not been the leaders or organizers
of drug conspiracies. They are also less likely than male offenders to
carry or use firearms or to engage in violent behavior. Indeed, many
female drug offenders are involved in drug trafficking conspiracies as
a result of their personal relationships with male co-defendants.
Under these circumstances, female offenders may be less culpable
than the drug amounts for which they are legally held responsible
would suggest. This problem is further compounded by the fact that,
as noted earlier, some female offenders undoubtedly participate in
drug conspiracies as a result of physical or psychological coercion.
When the sentence is bounded on the low end by a fixed mandatory
minimum, the sentencing judge may not be able to adjust it to fully
reflect the lesser culpability of such offenders.
As a result of this combination of developments, female offenders
160 Of course, this is true of some male offenders as well. However, the impact arguably
is greater on female offenders, due to their typically lesser roles. See supra notes 1-4.
161 See Schulhofer, supra note 103, at 85-54. For example, one convicted of distributing
five kilos of cocaine is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years (120 months).
The guidelines build on the mandatory minimum by fixing the distribution of five kilos of
cocaine at offense level 32 (121-51 months). Similarly, the guidelines account for the five
year (60 month) mandatory minimum associated with trafficking in 5OOg or more of co-
caine by pegging the offense level for offenses involving 500-2000g of cocaine at offense
level 26 (63-78 months). Intermediate drug amounts result in intermediate sentences-
thus, an offense involving between 2 and 3.5 KG of cocaine result in an offense level 28
(78-97 months). See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (drug quantity table), § 5A (sentencing table).
162 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988), ex-
tended the mandatory minimums to conspiracies to close a major disparity-producing
loophole in the statutory scheme; the ability of defendants and prosecutors to avoid
mandatory minimum sentences by plea bargaining to conspiracy charges. Unfortunately,
the 1988 provisions dramatically increased the sentencing exposure of minor players in
drug trafficking conspiracies, by holding all participants in a drug conspiracy liable for the
total quantity of drugs involved in the conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d
876, 892 (2d Cir. 1992) (total quantity of conspiracy's drug sales properly attributed to
defendants working at only one sales location). As a result, those with peripheral roles in
drug operations became subject to the same mandatory minimum penalties that Congress
had earlier reserved for leaders or direct participants in trafficking.
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who might otherwise have received more modest sentences of impris-
onment, intermediate sentences, or even probation, may have to serve
lengthy sentences for their minimal involvement in trafficking large
quantities of drugs. The Commission has recognized the potential in-
equities associated with quantity-driven guidelines and is exploring al-
ternatives which emphasize the presence of weapons and ancillary
violence. 163 The pressure to adjust to these inequities has led to the
development of means to avoid, for some female offenders,
mandatory minimums and the drug guidelines derived from
mandatory minimums. 164
b. The Unresolved Dilemmas of Guidelines Sentencing of Female
Offenders
Replacing a rehabilitation-based sentencing scheme in which fe-
male offenders received lenient treatment, with a guidelines sentenc-
ing system which includes rules designed to promote race, gender,
and socioeconomic neutrality, generates difficult policy choices. Fe-
male offenders differ from male offenders in a number of ways: the
possibility of pregnancy; the likelihood of sole parenting responsibili-
ties; the possibility that coercion or abuse influenced offense behav-
ior; and the existence of different patterns of co-defendant
dominance and role in the offense. The extent to which these differ-
ences should be recognized and accommodated in a guidelines sen-
tencing system is debatable. As noted, the sentencing reform
movement and the resulting federal sentencing guidelines scheme
emphasize considerations of crime control and deserved punishment
to a greater degree than was true in the past. From this perspective,
courts should limit the accommodation of gender differences to those
that bear on the offender's deserved punishment, or on considera-
tions of crime control, such as deterrence or incapacitation. Other
policy interests should play a secondary role.
A careful analysis of the special issues posed by female offenders
suggests that while factors such as the incidence of coercion or abuse
of female offenders and the lesser roles that female offenders tend to
play can and should be accommodated, special sentencing rules to
accommodate pregnancy or parental responsibilities are more diffi-
cult to justify. While compelling arguments support the view that
guidelines should reflect gender impacts on criminality and sentenc-
ing, statutory directives and important penological interests will make
it difficult. Moreover, any rules designed to account for the special
163 See Proposed Amendment 8 (on file with authors).
164 See infra part Ill.
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circumstances of female offenders create the risk of reinforcing the
negative gender stereotypes that underlay the paternalistic approach
to sentencing that prevailed in the 1960s and 1970s. These competing
policy considerations have posed, and will continue to pose, difficult
challenges to the Sentencing Commission.
III. WOMEN AND GUIDELINES SENTENCING:
A BRIEF EMPIRICAL OVERVIEW
This section examines data for three broad categories of offenses
within which female offenders are especially prominent: drug of-
fenses, embezzlement, and fraud. These data suggest that the real-
world consequences of the shift to ostensibly gender neutral guide-
lines have not been as dramatic as might have been expected, given
the difficult policy issues discussed in the previous section. In effect, it
appears that the considerable discretion in plea bargaining and sen-
tencing that remains in the guidelines scheme limits the sentence ex-
posure of female offenders and reintroduces some of the gender-
based leniency of pre-guidelines sentencing.
A. DRUG OFFENSES
More females are sentenced in the federal system for drug of-
fenses than for any other type of offense. 165 More than one-third of
all women receiving guidelines sentences in 1991 and 1992 committed
drug offenses.' 66 Thus, sentencing patterns for drug offenses reveal
much about the sentencing of females under the federal guidelines
scheme. An analysis of aggregate statistical data collected by the Com-
mission regarding sentencing of federal drug offenders reveals that
female offenders benefit disproportionately from each of the princi-
pal discretionary components in the guidelines scheme: downward
departure for substantial assistance to authorities;167 downward depar-
ture due to atypical facts or circumstances; 168 and selection of a sen-
tence from within the low end of the applicable sentencing range.
165 For example, fiscal year 1992 data reveal that 2127 females were sentenced for drug
offenses, 1863 of these for drug trafficking. See 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, Table
13. Over 1900 females were sentenced for drug offenses in fiscal year 1991. See U.S. SEN-
TENCING COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT, Table 17 (1991). In both 1991 and 1992, fraud ac-
counted for the next largest number of female sentences, 958 and 1176, respectively. See
1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3; 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra.
166 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 165, Table 17; 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3,
Table 13.
167 U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.




The Sentencing Reform Act instructs the Commission to consider
a defendant's assistance to authorities in the prosecution of others as
a mitigating factor.' 69 Furthermore, the Act specifically empowers
sentencing judges to depart below the guidelines or otherwise applica-
ble mandatory minimum sentences upon motion by the prosecution
certifying the substantial assistance of the defendant in the prosecu-
tion of others. 170 The Commission implemented Congress' substan-
tial assistance directive through § 5K1.1 of the guidelines. § 5K1.1
provides that a court may, upon motion of the government, depart
from the otherwise applicable guidelines range to reflect the defend-
ant's substantial assistance.
Substantial assistance departures under § 5K1.1 involve the exer-
cise of considerable discretion by both the prosecution and the sen-
tencing judge. As the Supreme Court has explained, § 5K1.1 "gives
the Government a power, not a duty, to file a motion when a defend-
ant has substantially assisted."171 A sentencing judge may also decline
to grant a substantial assistance motion filed by the government.
172
The Commission's data indicate that female drug offenders are
considerably more likely to receive substantial assistance departures than
their male counterparts. In fiscal year 1992, for example, 44.8% of
female drug offenders received downward departures for substantial
assistance, compared to just 28.1% of male drug offenders. 173 The
fiscal year 1991 data reveal a similar pattern, although the gender dif-
ference is not quite as marked.' 74
Researchers do not know enough about the underlying coopera-
tion practices of male and female offenders to conclude that equally
cooperative male and female offenders are treated dissimilarly. Nev-
169 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (1988) provides:
The Commission shall assure that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness
of imposing a lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed, including a sentence
that is lower than that established by statute as a minimum sentence, to take into
account a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of an-
other person who has committed an offense.
170 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1988), which provides:
Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority to impose a sen-
tence below a level established by statute as minimum sentence so as to reflect a de-
fendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person
who has committed an offense. Such sentence shall be imposed in accordance with
the guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission ....
171 Wade v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1840, 1843 (1992).
172 See United States v. Darner, 910 F.2d 1239, 1241 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 498 U.S.
991 (1990).
173 See U.S. Sentencing Comm'n. 1992 Data File, MONFY92.
174 In fiscal year 1991, 30.5% of female drug offenders received downward departures,
compared to 24.6% of males. See U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 1991 Data File MONFY91.
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ertheless, this pattern is notable, given the belief that female offend-
ers, who play minor roles in drug offenses, often lack sufficient
information to provide legally adequate substantial assistance. 175 Ex-
tensive field research on plea bargaining practices under the guide-
lines, conducted by Commissioner Ilene Nagel and Professor Stephen
Schulhofer, provides a plausible explanation for the substantial assist-
ance figures. 176 Their data, derived from extensive case record re-
views and field interviews with judges, probation officers, prosecutors,
and defense attorneys, suggest that factors other than the value of the
defendant's cooperation influence prosecutors' decisions to file
§ 5K1.1 motions. Specifically, they find that prosecutors often file
§ 5K1.1 motions to reduce the guidelines sentence for sympathetic de-
fendants, or defendants whose guidelines sentence exceeds prosecu-
tors' view of what the defendant deserves. 177 The disproportionate
share of substantial assistance departures received by female drug of-
fenders may reflect prosecutors' and judges' greater sympathy for fe-
male offenders.
178
2. Other Downward Departures
Still another mechanism for the exercise of discretion under the
guidelines scheme is the authority granted sentencing judges to de-
part from the applicable guidelines range in atypical cases. The Sen-
tencing Reform Act instructs judges to impose a sentence from within
the range specified by the applicable guidelines unless there are aggra-
175 See, e.g., Raeder, supra note 73, at 981-82.
176 Seellene H. Nagel & StephenJ. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of
Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CaL- L. REv.
501 (1992); StephenJ. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 Am. CRiM. L. Rv. 231 (1989).
177 See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 176, at 550.
178 Female drug offenders appear to benefit from prosecutorial and judicial discretion
in the form of charge bargaining as well. See Raeder, supra note 73, at 980 ("statistics reveal
the likelihood of significant charge bargaining by female drug offenders"). Drug traffick-
ing offenses under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846, which carry substantial mandatory minimum
sentences, are particularly prone to charge bargaining. Defendants can reduce their statu-
tory exposure significantly by pleading to use of a communication facility in committing a
drug offense, 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (1988) (48 month maximum); simple possession, 21
U.S.C. § 844 (1988) (12 month maximum); or misprision of a felony, 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1988)
(36 month maximum).
Female drug offenders are more likely than male offenders to successfully plead to
these lesser offenses. In fiscal year 1991, females accounted for 12.6% of offenders sen-
tenced for substantive drug trafficking offenses, but 28.6% of those guilty of a communica-
tions facility offense, 18% of those guilty of simple possession, and 30.6% of those guilty of
misprision offenses involving drugs. The 1992 data reveal a similar pattern. Females ac-
counted for 11.9% of trafficking sentences in that year. But females received 25.5% of
communications facility sentences, 25.1% of simple possession sentences, and 31.2% of
drug-related misprision sentences. See Data File, supra notes 173-74.
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vating or mitigating circumstances, not adequately considered by the
Commission in adopting the guidelines, which warrant a different sen-
tence. t79 Departures are subject to appellate review.'80 The power to
depart is, however, discretionary in the sense that a judge's decision
not to depart from the guidelines range is not subject to appellate
review.' 8 '
As was the case with substantial assistance, female drug offenders
receive downward departures more often than male drug offenders.
In 1991, the rate of downward departure was 10.3% for females and
7.2% for males. That disparity increased in fiscal year 1992. In that
year, 14.3% of female drug offenders received downward departures,
compared to only 6.7% of males-a ratio of more than 2 to 1.
3. Points Within the Range
Sentencing judges also have discretion to select any sentence
from within the applicable guidelines range. This authority is both
broader and narrower than the authority to depart. It is broader in
the sense that the selection of the point within the guidelines range is
not subject to appellate review; it is narrower in the sense that the
impact on the defendant's sentence is circumscribed by the outer
points of the range, which may not exceed the greater of six months
or twenty-five percent.'
8 2
The Commission's data suggest a modest correlation between
gender and the selection of the point within the range used in impos-
ing sentence. For purposes of analysis, the Commission data divide
the sentencing range into quartiles. A comparison of defendants re-
ceiving sentences at the bottom of the range (the first quartile) reveals
the same pattern of preferential treatment of female offenders. In
fiscal year 1991, the percentage of women at the bottom of the range
exceeded that of men by only a one percent margin, 44.5% to 43.5%.
However, in 1992, that margin increased to almost sixteen percent,
58.0% to 42.2%.
In short, the data indicate that female drug offenders benefit
from sentencing mitigation at every turn-in plea bargaining, sub-
stantial assistance motions, departure from the applicable guidelines
range, and selection of the sentence from within the applicable guide-
179 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
180 See 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1988).
181 See, e.g., United States v. Morales, 898 F.2d 99, 100 (9th Cir. 1990).
182 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b) (2) (1988). For example, the guidelines sentencing range of
an offender with an offense level of 10 and a criminal history category of I is 6-12 months, a
difference of 6 months; an offender whose offense level is 27 and whose criminal history
category is IV, has a guidelines sentencing range of 100-125 months, a range of 25%.
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lines range.18 3 While some of this undoubtedly reflects underlying
differences in male and female criminality in drug cases, the perva-
siveness of the pattern, along with the research findings of Nagel and
Schulhofer, 18 4 suggests that females are treated more leniently than
similarly situated males. The discretion that remains in the guidelines
scheme seems to provide a mechanism through which courts and
prosecutors revert to pre-guidelines sentencing patterns. These pat-
terns are replicated, to a lesser extent, in sentencing for embezzle-
ment and fraud.
B. EMBEZZLEMENT OFFENSES
Females convicted of embezzlement are more likely than males to
receive downward departures for reasons other than substantial assist-
ance. In 1992, the rate of downward departure was 9.8% for female
embezzlers and 7.5% for male embezzlers. Similarly, in 1991 the
downward departure rates for females and males were 10.0% and
6.6% respectively.
Similarly, commission data establish that females convicted of em-
bezzlement are more likely than males to receive sentences at the bot-
tom of the applicable guidelines range. In 1992, the percentages in
the first quartile were 74.1% and 67.6%, respectively. In 1991, the
figures were 75.0% and 65.0%, respectively.
Given the nature of the offense of embezzlement, substantial
assistance departures were comparatively rare, 3.4% in 1992 and 2.4%
in 1991.185 Curiously, men were somewhat more likely than women to
receive departures for substantial assistance under § 5K1.1.' 86 As
noted, the opposite is true in drug offenses. The reason for this is
unclear.
C. LARCENY
Finally, the patterns for defendants convicted of larceny resemble
those for offenders convicted of embezzlement. In both 1991 and
1992, females were substantially more likely to receive a sentence at
183 Female drug offenders also are twice as likely as males to receive mitigating adjust-
ments for playing a minimal or minor role in the offense. See, Data File, supra notes 173-74.
184 See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 176.
185 The crime of embezzlement, unlike drug trafficking or racketeering offenses, typi-
cally does not involve an extensive organization, but tends to be committed by individual
employees with easy access to the embezzled funds. Thus, the opportunity for cooperation
in the investigation of others is comparatively rare.
186 The rates of substantial assistance departure for men and women respectively were
4.4% and 3.4% in 1992, 3.4% and 2.4% in 1991. It is important to emphasize, however,
that the absolute numbers of such departures were quite small-17 men and 15 women in
1992, 12 men and 10 women in 1991. See Data File, supra notes 173-74.
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the bottom of the range (79.5% to 56.3% in 1992, 75.0% to 56.2% in
1991); females were somewhat more likely than males to receive
downward departures under the general departure provisions of
§ 5K2.0 (3.0% to 2.5% in 1992, 3.8% to 3.1% in 1991); and females
were less likely to receive departures for substantial assistance (6.7%
to 3.9% in 1992, 7.5% to 3.2% in 1991).
CONCLUSION
The transition from a sentencing system featuring virtually unlim-
ited judicial discretion to a system in which that discretion is struc-
tured and limited through presumptively binding guidelines, which
delineate the factors to be taken into account at sentencing and spec-
ify the weight to be accorded those factors, is a difficult one. Tough
policy choices previously made on an ad hoc basis, and therefore hid-
den from public view, must now be articulated and incorporated into
guidelines applied to the vast range of offenders and offenses.
The difficulties of this transition are especially acute with respect
to female offenders, who differ from male offenders in a number of
ways and who traditionally received lenient treatment in the pre-
guidelines era. Analysis of the policy questions posed by the sentenc-
ing of female offenders under the guidelines suggests that the desire
to avoid a disparate impact on female offenders through facially neu-
tral guidelines must not eclipse the principles of desert and crime
control that animate our sentencing policy, or the fact that the lenient
treatment of women in the criminal justice system may have macro-
level social costs which must be weighed against any micro-level bene-
fits to individual offenders.
In any event, the federal sentencing guidelines have not elimi-
nated the favorable treatment of female offenders. Special treatment,
not equal treatment, persists. The extent to which this differential
treatment reflects differences in male and female criminality is not
clear. To the extent that these findings reflect a continuation of the
pre-guideline pattern of paternalistic treatment of female offenders,
however, they highlight the difficulty of full implementation of sen-
tencing reform, as well as the complexity of the issues involved.
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